How do digital technologies function for the state in its pacification strategies concerning the dissident political bodies, their subjectivities and communicative capabilities? How does resistance take place against the surveillance practices which come to the fore as a state form, as a means of social control, and as a mechanism of creating manageable and disciplined crowds? Drawing upon the ethnographic data, this article attempts to discuss these questions, by focusing on the contemporary politics surrounding the Kurdish movement in Turkey. In particular, it presents an analysis of the digitized surveillance and resistance of Kurds both of which come to function as crucial components of the contemporary power regimes in Turkey.
Introduction
This article explores the ways in which the use of digital technologies has become a political power in Kurdish/Turkish relations in novel ways. Kurdish/Turkish relations have historically been shaped by the Kurdish insurgent nationalist movement, claiming the cultural and political rights of Kurds, including the official recognition of Kurds as a unique cultural group as well as the free exercise of their cultural identity and language in state institutions, and the pacification regimes of the state that regards this movement as a major threat to the territorial and political status quo in the region. 1 The object and target of the contemporary form of power is the political bodies, acting and speaking for this movement, their political subjectivities and their communicative capabilities.
This new form of power, which makes use of digital technologies, functions in two paradoxical and related ways. As a state form, it captures the flow of information and colonizes physical and cognitive spaces of bodies in their daily practices and communications through preemptive, decentralized and routinized digital surveillance, and accordingly feeds off the juridical and police systems where collected data become evidences to put thousands of people on counterterrorism trials with accusations of the involvement, support or sympathy for terrorism. As a form of resistance, on the other hand, it enables the rupture of the control over information networks and provoking new language to emerge that both negotiate, and resist the all-encompassing colonization of communication. Importantly, Kurdish activists have been using these technologies, particularly the Internet, to produce effective critiques of these trials, the preemptive surveillance, and to continue generating new discourses and representations, asserting their ethnic and political identities. While neither the control nor the resistance of Kurds take place only in digital spaces through the applications of information technologies; these technologies provide a new rationale for the state control and for the Kurdish resistance in terms of creating new communicative spaces where all public spaces are shrunk due to the prevalent forms of surveillance.
Apart from an attempt to show that the Turkish state has become a truly technological surveillant state, particularly in relation to the dissident politics which is not limited to the Kurdish movement but enacted on Kurds more forcefully, this study aims to discuss the ways in which the surveilled bodies, namely Kurds, experience, manage and resist the new forms of power in practice, in their daily lives and in their political activities. In doing so, it also aims to contribute to the literature on the new forms of power that largely focuses on surveillance or resistance in western societies.
In what follows, I will first engage with some of the relevant theoretical literature on modern and postmodern forms of control as well as on resistance and draw an outline the ways in which new control regimes operationalizes its power on and other strangers that they like to reach. In response to this, the resistive politics aims to gain the means of communicability particularly through the use of the Internet (mostly the social media) to create new languages, new selves, new modes of speech and new places for discussions and exchange that do not only address the Kurdish users but also the non-Kurds who are unfamiliar with the Kurdish reality. Finally, in the last part, I will sketch an outline of contemporary authoritarian regime of the technological surveillant state and the resistive politics of digital young Kurds, which, I will suggest, also informs the whys and wherefores of the Gezi Movement of 2013 that has become one of the most diverse revolt of young people, including the Kurds, in the history of Turkey.
Understanding Surveillance and Resistance in Contemporary Societies
Recent studies on surveillance show that there is an intrinsic link between the digitization of information, the ubiquitous use of information technologies by citizens/consumers, and the unprecedented level of recording, storing, and manipulation of information by those with an access to the data 2 . As bodies are immersed in digital spaces through the exposure and use of credit cards, electronic IDs, cellphones, telephones, the Internet, city cameras, data-mining systems etc., they leave traces behind themselves as they move, act and communicate within the fluctuating and flexible networks. Hence these facilities and possibilities of monitoring provided by digital technologies amplify the state capabilities for control, which give rise to the concerns about the maintenance of democracy and civil rights 3 and the rise of new forms of authoritarianism. 4 Deleuze defines this new form of society that is administered and managed through computerized systems of surveillance as 'society of control', where mechanisms of command become ever more fluid and immanent to the social field, distributed throughout the bodies of citizens/consumers that are no longer individuals (corporeal bodies) but dividuals, corruption of subjectivity'. 6 'The indefiniteness of the place of the social production corresponds to the indeterminacy of the form of the subjectivities produced'. 7 The technological control partake in these subjectification processes, generating a simulated version of surveilled bodies, a sort of additional self, 8 or a data double of pure virtuality 9 whose narrative is necessarily different from the reflection of an original referent due to the technological re-presentation. 10 The re-presentation and re-creation of bodies in scanscapes is used for a variety of tasks within increasingly dominant modes of risk management, including the financial, ecological, and security risks. This sort of creation and re-creation of selves and worlds that we inhabit within digital technoscape can be best understood with the Warner's conceptualization of counterpublics. 28 He writes, 'counterpublics are publics', too, that are produced through circulatory discourses, addressing diverse people, including the strangers, hailing them into particular positions, 'providing a sense of active belonging that masks or compensates the real powerlessness of human agents in capitalist society'. 29 The difference of counterpublic to public discourse, on the other hand, is that it 'remains distinct from the authorities' and that 'have critical relation to power'.
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The counterpublic does not conflict with power because it comes to the fore as a reflection of subculture or oppositional identities formed elsewhere, but precisely as the form of recreation of languages, discourses and of subjectivities that challenge the dominant groups, ideas, policies as well as speech genres and modes of address that constitute the public. 
Kurds of Turkey
Kurds constitute the largest nation in the world without a state, and they struggle for their cultural and political rights in countries where they reside. Kurds of Turkey have been in revolt against the political project of the Turkish Republic, which aimed to develop nationhood based on the Turkish language, and the imagined national identity that required a break with the religiosity, local traditions, and non-Turkic operations against the PKK militants, but focused more on judiciary and police system through which thousands of people are put on anti-terror trials as well as on the propaganda machine of media through which politicians of BDP attempted to be discredited. 41 As a consequence of this new political strategy, more than twelve thousand people, including Kurdish politicians, journalists, students, doctors, mayors etc., are put on trials with accusations of aiding, abetting or being a member of the 42 According to Alexa.com, the most popular site is Facebook, then follows Google Türkiye, Youtube etc. Twitter has been within the top ten, but after Gezi Protests where Twitter has become one of the leading virtual platform for the mobilization of protestors, it has be attracted more users. (see www.alexa.com/topsites/countries/TR).
The Production of Control and Its Effects
The surveillant regime of Turkey is not a new phenomenon. The novelty lies in the growth of technological authoritarianism that amalgamates the force of law, police and technology to produce digital materials that can easily be manipulated to generate fake conversations, fabricated images and narratives of crimes when there is no rational basis that prove the crime. Although one cannot argue that all evidences presented in the indictments of anti-terror trials are based on the technological mutation of non-evidence of crimes, there seems to be some concrete reasons that worry the lawyers, human rights associations and civil right activists about the way technological control functions to manufacture crime. One of the lawyers of KCK case in Diyarbakır explains his experiences in these trials:
The indictments start with the hundreds of pages of KCK history, then continues with few testimonials of hidden witnesses and then hundreds of pages of transcriptions, obtained from remote listening, transcriptions of wiretapping, text messages etc. All of these are read in courts. So the private lives of all these suspects are heard by everyone…the court becomes like a gossip program…since none of these information prove any crime on rational basis, then the prosecutors claim that they are encrypted messages.
Some of the examples of the evidences written in the indictments are as following:
SMS message like '37 B Black' sent from a suspect to her sister, asking her to buy a bra in this size and color is interpreted by the prosecutor as an encryption of a bomb, or a telephone conversation where the Turkish professor speaking on the phone to another KCK suspect where she is invited to a meeting and responds by saying 'inshallah' is interpreted as the conscious admission of participating in the terrorist organizations' meetings, or a photograph of an illiterate old Kurdish woman in a protest in Diyarbakır taken by police cameras is claimed to be an evidence of her managerial position in KCK, responsible for sending emails to protestors to invite them to the violent protest.
In the face of these sort of evidences, lawyers maintain that they feel desperate and 'do not know how to defend them' as one lawyer in Diyarbakır says or 'I feel as if I was given a role to play in an absurd comedy, a sort of deadly joke' as another lawyer in Mardin says. The progress of trials is also blocked by the denial of the request of Kurdish suspects to defend themselves in Kurdish in courts, while almost half of the wiretappings are in Kurdish and translated into Turkish as evidences of their ties to terrorism.
While the cases are in deadlock due to the denial of the suspects' demand to
give testimony in Kurdish and to the lack of hard evidences, proving the crime on rational basis, the effect of surveillance on the surveilled bodies becomes pressing, as these bodies feel the constant relentless of being watched in their daily activities and communications. A female municipal worker, who is on KCK trial without detention with the accusation of helping the KCK without being a member of it, explains this effect:
when you are taken into custody, they put all information on the table they collected throughout some time without your knowledge…it's terrifying to see…I mean, as if I was always naked…and the way they present all these things in indictments…all pieces are sewn together to create another you… the data is yours, but the story is not… what is most terrifying is not my possible detention or imprisonment, but to see how they control everything, every minute of your life and manipulate everything in the way they want. The ordinary daily language, which all of us dwell by, is not only instrumental and practical, but also performative in the sense that nuances of meaning are captured and determined within the context of speech and diction. Thus, the amputation of language brings forth the felt loss of possibilities of language games, jokes, humors, ironies and gossips, which make an ordinary speech and daily conversation a dwelling container for human interaction. 43 A primary school teacher in Diyarbakır tells me that he 'cannot even make gossips. Because you know, all conversations are being read in courts. I mean the problem is not only that you have no privacy, no secrets any more, but also your relationships can be troubled' due to the potentials that private might become public and the coherent conversation might become incoherent or might take up other meanings in unpredictable ways through the technological re-presentation.
The boundaries between private and public that protect the invasion of one from another evaporate.
In addition to the extra carefulness that they adopt in their daily speeches on the phone or in particular places where they are sure of its surveillance, most of my places seem to be lost, the motivation to use all non-places for resistance might become more forceful. While the inmates started a hunger strike, which lasted approximately 70 days with a demand for Kurdish language rights in courts as well as in education, and end to the denial of PKK leader's right to communicate with lawyers, the younger digital political bodies outside prisons continue their struggle, particularly with a strive to gain the means of communicability in digital spaces as well as in streets.
The production of the political in digital counterpublics
The recognition of limitations and inequalities that subsist in the virtual world and the potentialities that are immanent to the artificiality (the virtual self-design) of 90 per cent of Kurds write [on the net] with other persona, using other proxies etc., we know that we are not free on the virtual either, we know that we are considered as threats, this is something transferred from the real world. It is like the political consciousness to desire not to decipher one's identity, it is the outcome of political reality, not fear.. I have always been a regular user… I created characters for myself. So I thought if I can create a character that becomes very popular on the net, I can do many other things over there. This is how I do it, how I started using it for my own purposes'.
Particularly against the existing forms of information monopoly and media synopticism, Kurds appropriate the virtual space to make their own news and share it with the larger public, preferably containing ones unfamiliar to the Kurdish reality.
The News Network
Apart from professional online news agencies such as ANF and DİHA, and web TV such as Nurce, IMC TV etc., amateur news agencies, blogs and social media are adopted by the political agents to create an alternative news space that would ideally have an effect on people's agenda and their decision making, while the news is central to the making of political culture in Turkey. For instance, the Uludere/Roboski case which did not get coverage in mass media for some ten hours after the massacre due to the governmental pressure on mediascape was first announced in these proKurdish news agencies, then spread to the social media (twitter and Facebook), and 'What the government has been doing is to silence all others. The mainstream media were contributing to this aim. We asked ourselves, why don't we create our own news network. Then, we began doing citizen journalism [on social networks]. We wanted to make objective news about the medical conditions of inmates that were on hunger strikes to inform their families and the larger public. We knew that there would be pressure from the state, but we have nevertheless continued'.
Açlık Postası has become, unexpectedly, as the founder of the network says, one of the most alternative news social network groups in a very short time. Through the virtual community of followers and contributers, they organized a campaign by calling everyone to withdraw money from their bank account and write that 'do not remain silent to the strikes' and put the money into ATM machines to make others engage with the discourses written on the banknotes. Along with this campaign, political netizens continued publishing photos of the strikers with provocative messages, with a claim to decipher the existence of mass hunger strike and opening discussion sites about the strike to mobilize people to become supporters of the struggle of the strikers. In the end, when the strike has become an undeniable issue to be discussed in the political landscape; the government took an action to communicate with the leader of PKK to make him stop the strike. The strike ended; the talks between the state and the PKK leader have eventually restarted in January 2013. The group, then, changed the name into Ötekilerin Postası and continues to be followed by thousands of users, who do not only include Kurds but all others who have lost their trust in the mainstream media if they ever had. 46 Neither the Uludere case nor the campaigns supporting hunger strike are mere outcomes of the particular use of the net.
However, these examples show how the virtual and the actual circulate and affect each other in the insurgent politics of Kurds and also others when their voices, representations and their language and discursive practices are attempted to be silenced through the digital surveillance, media synopticism and juridicial operations.
Resistance as the form of new discourse: 'modern Kurdi perspective'
Along with the struggle to create an alternative news platform that would ideally resist the synoptic control of power, the Kurdish users, particularly the younger ones aim to present and develop a 'modern Kurdi perspective', as some of my informants have put it, by way of Internet. The 'modern Kurdi perspective' refers to a search for a new political subjectivity, new discourse and a new language that differs from the traditional Kurdish discourse, while not breaking the continuity with the historical claims of cultural and political rights. The collective called Kurd 2.0 who controls different personas on social media (Özgür Amed in Facebook, Özgür Gündem, 46 During Gezi protests, the network has continued to be one of the popular networks for the protesters who are in the streets and in social media, actualizing the biggest national revolt of the Turkish history. However, the Facebook page has been closed for a short period of time and then recreated as once again a popular Facebook group with the help of the contributors and followers. The typical Kurdish discourse was based on the language of victim. We, Kurds, had tried to show that we were existent in the first place, then we tried to show that we're dying. But there is no need for this. They already know what they did to us. It is as clear as crystal. What we need is real resistance. We need a new language to express ourselves. I perceive humor, irony and sarcasm as the most resisting tools to throw the fireball back to the ones who threw at us. This is what Kurd 2.0 is about, as far as I am concerned.
In the above narrative of the famous Kurdish digital activist, the Internet 2.0 provides a new rationale for the social imaginary of a new political subjectivity with a new discourse, and a language where potentially all Kurdish users can become the producers of discourses that would represent themselves in a way that challenges the typical representations of Kurds as a victimized group, as a political identity whose language is diseased by Turkish. This activist, who lives in Diyarbakır in his 30's, defines Turkish as 'a virus' not only as a language that the state obliges all citizens to speak, write and receive schooling in, but also as a discourse which also affected the ways in which Kurds speak about themselves, represent their political subjectivity and their claims in public/private spaces either in Kurdish or Turkish. The search for a new language and new perspective, which suggests a new political subjectivity that is framed as Kurd 2.0 is a struggle to transgress the dominance of Turkish as a discourse
(not merely as a language of everyday life and institutional practice), which locks up Kurdish language and discourse as a non-language, a discourse of backwardness, feudality, terrorism, armed rebellions, and of the periphery who has to sacrifice their lives for the struggle of their cultural and ethnic identity. The mode of interaction and addresses, and the form of language of the virtual exchange and discussions that allows for humor, laughter, abusive messages that become easily viral and effective in particular brevity required in Facebook and Twitter contributes to the conceptualization of Kurd 2.0 which proposes not only a new language, a new subjectivity and also a joy for the political action.
A writer of Tolaz (a Kurdi humorous news network) that is connected to the counterpublic of Kurd 2.0 says:
'I was raised in a politically conscious family. But I was also assimilated, cannot really read and speak in Kurdish. Living in Istanbul, I was feeling isolated from political discussions. The Internet has become a place for me to meet other Kurds. I was writing for the forums, dictionaries like Zıtferheng. Then I came across the Kurd 2.0…The meaning of 2.0 is a lot for us. It is a new perspective, something like more integrated into the contemporary times. We speak about films, arts and also politics. We believe that the language of politics needs to be lightened. We need to entertain ourselves as well. The politics should be joyful. The serious guys who are old and respected (kelli felli) are like boring. I respect them but I cannot really listen to them for so long…The use of humor mobilizes our target group as well. We criticize everything, KCK cases, TC, including the Kurdish politics but in our humorous ways which is more critical and effective in our opinion'. Facebook and who also involves in polemical discussions with Kurd 2.0 says, 'we need a theoretical, intellectual basis for our movement that has to be founded upon our history. My followers and I are having intellectual discussions about ourselves and our identity. We should be able to define ourselves with our self-determination as a nation, but this should not be exclusive of our religious identities, nor of our history and tradition'.
The counterpublics that are formed by these digital Kurds who do not aim to reach only Kurdish political agents but also others and recreate themselves and languages in new forms through the exchange and discussions are attempts to challenge the dominant culture and power -be it the state power, the official discourse of the Turkish authorities that are internalized by Turkish nationalists, the PKK doctrines, the patriarchal language that constitutes women, trans-identities in unprivileged positions.
As one of the male users that I interviewed in Diyarbakır says, 'all of us are searching for Kurdi perspective, Kurdi discourse, Kurdi language for everything we say…this is like we're integrated into the contemporary era, but we are not assimilated.. We criticize even some notions, approaches of the movement but not with the language of T.C, or with the state'. In this regard, they attempt to generate a modern Kurdi perspective as a discursive event which is always already related to the political and ethnical struggle that has been carried out through armed struggle and representations of Kurds in the parliament, but also radically different from those in the way it takes up the task of producing an ever new language and discourse, housing the laughter, joy, fluidity in terms of being inclusive all oppositional subject positions and critical to any forms of authority, and articulating design, and aesthetics in digital mediascape and creative/cultural industries. In other words, they strive to produce the new means of 'the political' as the state power adopts new pacification regimes to tame their communicative and cognitive capacities.
While the digital activism is not regarded as a form of political action that would bring 'revolution' by itself to the territory of the region by my informants, all of them consider the discursive potentialities of the net 'one of the essential sites of contemporary political movements that aim to mobilize young people' as Radikal Öğretmen (his Facebook persona) puts it, or 'something that shows that technologies are not only in the service of the state, but also the people's as a cafe co-owner in Diyarbakır in his late 20s states.
Conclusion in the light of Gezi Protests
In this research, I have attempted to explore the form of state control and resistance of Kurds that make use of digital information technologies in the last couple of years in Turkey where not only the Kurdish political subjects but also other dissident agents of Turkey have been feeling the pressing pressure on the freedom of information and speech. The amalgamated force of law and technology on Kurdish bodies, which is also strengthened by the mass medial representations of Kurds, has amputated the possibilities of ordinary language, representation and discourses for Kurdish bodies.
Particularly post-structuralist theories inform us that it is language that initiates subjectivity. Through the destructive attempts on the possibilities of language, historically on the mother language, currently on the means of speech and diction in any language that Kurds and their surveillors know, the political bodies, their subjectivities and communicative capabilities are attempted to be colonized.
I consider the digital activism of Kurds, as an attempt to regain the agency in meaning production, retrieval of the political body and the construction of a language to invent the means of speech and discourse that would ideally represent themselves at their self-presence. As most of my informants have underlined repetitiously, the activism on the net is the one that is relevant until someone takes off the plug and yet till that moment, it functions as a space for possibilities of communications that might have an impact on the real life. The Kurds for whom the public and private spaces of speech and diction are shrunk due to the prevalent surveillance, create a counterpublic where they reach out the others and recreate themselves in the exchange and discussions with others out of the virtual space of the net. The political Kurds, particularly young ones, appropriate these technologies, specifically the Internet to transform the political language and traditionally instituted political subjectivities as well as the larger dominant political culture that institute them as unprivileged citizens of Turkey that are attempted to be pacified in changing regimes of power. As cyborgs, simians, or produsers living, communicating and producing within digital ecology, they know how to go around the filter systems, to meet and reach others in ways that affect the non-Kurds in digital mediascape. They are political. Their digital daily struggle is a cultural and political struggle that cannot be dissociated from the historical insurgent politics of Kurds, claiming the language and education rights. Yet, the way they produce the political is radically different from their elders or from the ones' who are involved in older forms of political struggle. They take politics seriously, but the language they use, seem to enjoy the possibilities of humor, laughter and sarcasm. They value the political struggle as an essential part of their subjectivity, however they do not want to accept the call to sacrifice their lives, youth and love for the political struggle. They are the counterpublic of the new pacification regimes that make use of fluid system to control the economic, social and political forces. 48 Cited from Burçe Çelik, 'The Revolt of the Diverse Youth and the Production of the Political', opendemocracy, (7.June.2013 ) (www.opendemocracy.net).
